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Abstract 
 
This paper intends to draw overall lessons from a long-term study on CO2 
emission in France, a country with a rather low energy/GDP ration and in 
which transition to non-fossil based production of electricity has been 
achieved. More generally, it points out the importance of possible bifurcation 
effects, and draws methodological and policy implications from these state-
ments. It discusses modelling approaches to the linkages between energy and 
the rest of economy, and addresses the issue of difficulties in cost assessment 
analysis in the presence of several baseline scenarios. Finally, it proposes a 
more encompassing definition of no regrets policies. 
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In a context of enormous uncertainty, discussions on the costs of climate 
change policies are deadlocked by two critical difficulties: the assessment of 
the short and long term flexibility of our consumption and production systems 
and the choice of incentive instruments to trigger this flexibility and abate an-
thropogenic GHGs emissions at a minimum economic cost. The connection 
between these two points of contention is obvious in the classical debate on 
the relative role of price induced and "autonomous" technical progress in the 
past decrease in energy intensity: i to adopt a high value of autonomous energy-
efficiency improvements minimizes the cost of the abatement strategies and 
emphasizes the influence of non- pricing policies on energy demand trends. 
Conversely, a conventionnal model assumes price signals to be the sole policy 
variable and concludes that abatement costs will be high in the absence of 
cheap supply-side solutions. 
A satisfactory conclusion to this debate requires some methodological pro-
gress and no doubt it will be brought by on-going works. I would like to elabo-
rate here some ways to approach these issues, based on the lessons drawn from 
a prospective study carried out in the context of the Atelier de Prospective En-
ergétique (APE) of the French Commissariat Général du Plan (CGP). ii 
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In order to examine the long-term flexibility of our economies the "French 
case" is of some interest: 
• As regards to the ultimate limits of energy-growth decoupling and the 
role of nuclear energy as a substitute for fossil fuelsiii, France is charac-
terised by one of the lowest energy/GDP ratio among the OECD coun-
tries, and by a dominant share of carbon free energies (nuclear and hy-
dro) in the production of electricity, 
• Methodologically, because the evidence of the role played by the trans-
portation in the long run raises questions until now overlooked in cur-
rent costing studies of the preventive strategies and substantially moves 
the terms of the debate on the no regrets concept. 
• In this paper, I shall not seek to go into all the details of the "French 
case", but to use it as an occasion for arguing in favour of some new re-
search priorities. For clarity, I shall explain briefly the reasons for some 
key methodological choices of our study before giving the main nu-
merical results and, in a third section, coming back to some general les-
sons. 
 
 
 
I. METHODOLOGICAL OPTIONS FOR 
DEALING WITH FLEXIBILITIES AS A 
FUNCTION OF LONG TERM EXPECTATIONS 
 
I.1. Brief insights on the institutional background 
The French CGP does not aim to take mandatory command and control deci-
sions. Bringing experts, business and trade union representatives together with 
the public administration, it tries to reveal some consensus on which to base 
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long- term policies. This procedural constraint partly determined the methodo-
logical choices for the study since they had to obtain some consensus in the 
commission. 
In the energy field, the controversies about long-term technological and con-
sumption patterns that lie energy behind energy demand, and the dramatic un-
certainties about external parameters such as the political stability of the Mid-
dle East and Eastern Europe, US energy policy and environmental concernsiv, 
engendered a consensus about the necessity of resorting to contrasted prospec-
tive scenarios. The aim was to sketch the boundary of the possibility set in the 
future and to facilitate discussions about the strategic hypotheses and their 
implicit assumptions by providing consistent pictures of competing views of 
the future. 
This led to the use, for the 2005 scenarios, of a disaggregated bottom-up 
model of the French energy system with 165 end energy uses, a precise de-
scription of vintages of equipment for each category of energy consumer and a 
modelling of induced investments. 
The 2005 balances, which derive from a consensus on the relevant scenarios 
which need to be constructed for strategic analysis, provide numerical picture 
of the range of opinions of experts about the international background, the 
technical degrees of freedom available and the social and political constraints 
which will ultimately determine the viability of any scenario. 
The climatic change issue, which requires the consideration of timescales far 
beyond the following decade, made it necessary and possible to partially relax 
this political acceptability constraint. Taking the 2005 balances as starting 
points, the long- term scenarios (2030) are consequently strictly exploratory, 
and aim to answer two sets of questions: 
• After 2005, will France, having exploited the maximum possible substi-
tution between carbon based electricity and nuclear energy, be faced 
with limits to further reductions of energy intensity, making it unable to 
accept any commitment to substantially reduce its CO2 emissions; if 
not, how far can technical innovation push these limits? 
• What could be the impacts of a carbon tax of FF1000 per tonne of car-
bon, as proposed by the Groupe Interministériel sur l'effet de serre?v 
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The high level of this tax is meant to give a strong enough price-signal enough 
to change both the consumption patterns and the technical innovation trends; it 
aims to stabilize long-term expectations and to counter the inherent instability 
of the energy markets. This level implies that the tax will be offset by a de-
crease in income tax, value-added tax and any other social contribution, so as 
to offer fiscal neutrality; its implementation will depend on a prior commit-
ment involving the main OECD countries, to avoid distortionary effects on 
international markets.vi 
Beyond the greenhouse issue, this proposal is part of a movement tending to 
envisage taxation of environmental externalities as a partial solution to the 
problem of raising revenue.Today, income taxes above a certain level provoke 
strong opposition and the internationalization of capital markets has reduced 
taxation on profit and capital; value added is then becoming the main fiscal 
base, which has a negative impact on both economic activity and employ-
ment.vii It is consequently timely to study whether taxation of bads (negative 
externalities) and not goods could be a possible answer. 
The economic models currently available, which were built to describe the 
short- and medium-term macroeconomic impacts of oil shocks and energy 
policies were not able to address these new issues. The problem was no longer 
one of describing economic behaviour with a given set of techniques, but ac-
counting of accounting for the changes in expectations likely to generate a 
new set at t + n. This carbon taxation scheme, complemented by accompany-
ing measures, is not meant to be an external shock on a system characterised 
by a given elasticity, but a signal aiming to upgrade this elasticity by improv-
ing the efficiency of energy markets and shifting technical innovation and con-
sumption behaviour on to a more energy saving path. 
• Unlike the situation after the past oil shocks, the fiscal neutrality prin-
ciple means that the product of this tax is immediately recycled in the 
national economy via the lower cost of other production factors (labor 
and capital) so as to reallocate investment decisions towards technology 
and consumption patterns with a lower carbon content. 
• A modelling structure, called IMACLIM, was designed to cope with 
these issues. This is not the occasion to go into the details of the meth-
odological solutions adopted viii but we will nevertheless elaborate 
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briefly on two critical points: the description of technological paths and 
the linkages between macroeconomy and technology assumptions. 
I.2. Technological trajectories between engineering 
optimism and macroeconomic pessimism 
It is now common knowledge that engineers and economists disagree 
about the abatement cost issue.ix The use of cost curves based on engineering 
datas enables optimization models, like EFOM or MARKAL, to write low-cost 
medium-term scenariosx because they rely yet on untapped energy-efficiency 
resources. Over the long term, the use of optimistic hypotheses on new tech-
nology vintagesxi leads to the same conclusion. As pointed out by Manne and 
Richels,xii economists tend to counter this engineering optimism about the "ef-
ficiency gap" by listing the following arguments: 
•  Nothing is said about the costs and political feasibility of removing the 
market imperfections explaining the gap between the economically 
sound energy consuming practices and those that are currently em-
ployed, 
• The feedback between technical progress and consumer behaviour is ig-
nored:  an improvement in motor efficiency lowers the cost per kilome-
tre driven and has the perverse effect of encouraging more trips; 
• It is a mistake to take into account technical progress on the production 
of existing goods and services but to ignore the endless process of the 
discovery of new needs and the development of new goods and services, 
some of them with a high energy content (holidays in tropical areas for 
example). 
However, the economists’ answer' to capturing these contradictory 
factors is mainly to rely on "top down" models. Econometrically calibrated 
over the past, these models are useful for describing an aggregated outcome 
over the short and medium term, but are less suitable for dealing with the long 
term, since we cannot robustly model feedbacks between economic incentives 
(prices, interest rates and funding policies) and technical change. 
Indeed, even if the distinction between autonomous and price-induced 
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technical progress is highly enlightening, its measure relies on a pure econo-
metric artefact. First, oil shocks have historically been systematically accom-
panied by measures such as incentives for investment on energy conservation, 
standards, information and training and have also been contemporaneous with 
structural changes in the industry. Second, some confusion arises from the fact 
that the autonomous trends is not strictly related to mere efficiency: it com-
pounds structural changes, (saturation of certain energy uses, decrease of en-
ergy intensive industries...), non-price induced technological progress, and 
non-price policies designed to enhance the uptake of energy-efficient tech-
niques. Third, these difficulties are exacerbated by the theoretical necessity of 
separating, in the price effect, the relative weight of short-term optimizing 
behaviour (the substitution effect) and that of innovation spurred by changes 
in long-term expectations; experience to date shows, indeed, that even a sud-
den change in these expectations can induce technological irreversibilities 
whose impact is far greater than the expected effect of a mere short-term and 
reversible response to price variations xiii. 
• In order to bridge, to whatever extent is feasible, the gap between engi-
neering perspective and economic perspective, while designing a tool 
able to explore alternative assumptions on technical progress, structural 
changes in industry and lifestyles, we tried to design an instrument 
which adhere to three basic principles: 
• To treat the assumptions about technology, structural change and behav-
iour not as grounded uniquely on current trends but as depending on 
controversy expert statements, and to be able to test the impact of cur-
rent controversies on the results of the scenarios. 
• To distinguish explicitly the needs likely to reach saturation levels in 
the future from consumption trends with linear or exponential growth, 
at least given our current knowledge. 
• To avoid the risks of a mere multiplication of technical assumptions by 
accounting for the effect of institutional inertia on the diffusion of tech-
nical and behavioural changes, verifying the consistency of the techno-
logical and structural assumptions with economic parameters such as 
personal income and the relative prices. 
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• We adopted a solution which may seem simple, but tried to take advan-
tage of the institutional context of this study, for which we had access 
to detailed exogenous expertise. It consists in using logistic functions in 
y = fk(r,p) and y = gk(t,p) with personal income (r) and prices (p) as ar-
guments for the segments of demand expected to reach saturation 
(dy/dr>0) xiv, and time (t) and energy prices (pe) for the energy-
efficiency coefficients of each technology (dy/dt<0). In the latter case, 
the role of time is to encompass capital turnover effects arising from the 
progressive diffusion of new technologies. 
 
The external expertise determines the asymptotes "k" for these logistic curves, 
which means that they can be changed in case of non consensus. Given the 
value of saturation levels, xv each curve can be benchmarked for the corre-
sponding techniques or end use, based on past observations (1973-1988) and 
on future data, in this case, APE's 2005 scenarios. For a given set of experts 
statements, the price of energy acts mainly as an accelerator in the technical 
diffusion (see Figure 1), and the benchmarking of the curve catches the non-
economic and non-technical inertia observable in the past and accounted for 
(or expected) by the of the APE expert in their 2005 scenarios. 
 
Figure n° 1 
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I.3. Macroeconomic costs: relaxing production 
functions 
The key limitation for a sound assessment of the long-term deadweight costs 
of emission abatement is the lack of homogeneity of the current treatment of 
the technical progress in the energy and non-energy sectors by energy-
macroeconomy models. Technical change in macroeconometrics is, indeed, 
whatever the level of disaggregation of the model, a "proxy" which encompas-
ses several factors: technical innovation in the engineer sense, intersectoral 
and intrasectoral structural changes, business cycles, strategic behaviour de-
parting from simple representations of microeconomic rationalities over the 
short and medium term (eg pursuit of investments in sectors with excess capa-
city to discourage competition). 
This makes it very hard to establish explicit links between production func-
tions in economic models and technology projections.xvi Therefore, unlike in 
the energy sector where it is possible to explore a wide range of alternative 
expert statements, the current practice in macroeconomic modelling (in gen-
eral also for equilibrium and macroeconometric models) is to use fixed pro-
duction functions for all sectors other than energy. This method is sound and 
reliable for the short-term analysis, but there are few logical grounds for as-
suming that a set of price or non-price long-term incentives to innovation 
would be of no effect on the production functions of the non-energy sectors in 
the long term. Consequently, in the case of a nested CES Cobb-Douglas for 
example, 
Yt = [a(Kt)ρα(Lt)ρ(1-α) + b(Et)ρβ(Nt)ρ(1-β)]1/ρ  
a carbon tax would not simply result in movement along a function character-
ized by a given set of coefficients a, b,     ; it would induce new expecta-
tions leading to a production function with new coefficients a', b', α∋, β∋, ρ' 
xvii. 
Because of the scarcity of factual findings about the possible range of varia-
tion of those coefficients with time, we used a backward induction procedure 
connected with a general equilibrium approach. Each scenario is considered 
consistent with a long-term static macroeconomic equilibrium (absence of 
public deficit, balance between income and expenditure for all sectors), this 
equilibrium being the result of non-specified production functions for non-
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energy sector (a single composite good in the first version of the model). The 
macroeconomic context of the scenario is then fully explained by our assump-
tions about technology, structural change and demographics. Then the coeffi-
cients of the implicit production function can be calculated at the margin by 
interpreting (with a very few ad hoc hypotheses) the results of the taxation 
scenarios at constant economic growth as giving the partial derivatives to 
prices (see the appendix). 
Only one additional hypothesis is necessary to solve the equation system and 
assess the impact of a carbon tax on the equilibrium of each scenario xviii), the 
impact of higher prices of fossil fuels on the cost of the composite good. This 
in turn depends on the coefficients of the new production function. It is then 
possible to carry out sensitivity tests on the impact on the macroeconomic 
equilibrium of a wide range of values for resulting total productivity: the pro-
duction cost of the composite good is increased of the total value of additional 
energy costs in the case of technical inflexibility, and remains constant in the 
case of an efficient long-term response to the price signal. 
II. II. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS AND THE 
EVIDENCE OF POSSIBLE BIFURCATIONS 
II.1. Three baseline scenarios 
In the spirit of the above, three baseline scenarios were built, for the period 
beyond 2005, describing various expectations over the long term and different 
development strategies; the choices underlying each of them (in industry, 
building, and transport) were made without any particular connection with 
environmental concerns or with domestic energy policy. A carbon tax was then 
applied to each of these baseline scenarios, progressively increasing to FF1000 
per tonne carbon (tC). Tables 1 and 2 give energy consumption figures for 
1988. 
Reference scenarios (REF, REF1). These scenarios extrapolate the trends of 
the central APE scenario for 2005, with a 2.5% GDP growth rate between 
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2005 and 2030. The REF1 scenario assumes the implementation of a carbon 
tax without accompanying measures. 
• These scenarios project current trends in France's energy supply (Tables 
4-7),  an increase in the share of the nuclear power, a decline in coal 
production, and no particular emphasis on the development of renew-
able energy sources. On the demand side, the decreasing energy content 
of goods and services reaches an asymptote as a result of no specific in-
centives for energy efficiency; at the same time, some components of 
the consumption pattern (space heating, utilities, number of cars per 
household) tend to saturation. By contrast, no saturation was taken into 
account in other transport sectors such as freight, air and public trans-
port since there is currently no evidence for such trends in France. 
• An oil price of US$40/bbl was chosen since both economic growth and 
energy intensity are on a rather high trend, therefore accelerating the 
pressure on depletable resources (we implicitly assume that all major 
industrialized countries are on the same path). The price of electricity 
was assumed to remain constant, implying that technical progress will 
offset the cost of nuclear plant dismantling and renewing installed ca-
pacities. 
Energy-efficiency scenarios (ME, ME1). xix These scenarios (Tables 8-11) fol-
low the same development pattern as the REF scenarios, but with a strong pol-
icy in favour of energy efficiency. In our scenarios, this is reflected in the use 
of lower asymptotes for the energy intensities. In the ME1 scenario, the trick-
ling down of this technical progress is accelerated by the carbon tax. 
Structural change scenarios (MS, MS1). These scenarios (Tables 12 and 13) 
describe a different development pattern while adopting the same assumptions 
for energy efficiency as those of the ME scenarios. They envisage a context 
where, for reasons unconnected with the greenhouse concerns or energy secu-
rity, new orientations are taken in two fields: growth is based less on energy 
intensive industries, and there is a reduced demand for freight and passenger 
transportation. 
These scenarios begin in 2005 because our focus was the possible saturation in 
the decoupling between GHG emissions and economic growth over the long 
term, and because climate policies were not considered in the possible base-
lines for 2005. In order to check the possibility of meeting the TORONTO 
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targetsxx without structural and more controversial policies, a third ver-
sion of ME and MS scenarios was also constructed (ME2, MS2) assuming 
ME1 policy to be launched earlier, namely in 1992 (Tables 14-17). 
II.2. The reversal of the current trend in decreasing 
CO2 emissions: a high probability risk? 
The REF scenario points to the possibility of a sharp increase of the CO2 
emissions between 2005 and 2030. The CO2/GDP ratio decreases by about 
46%, but this does not prevent a reversal of the decreasing trend in total CO2 
emissions as observed between 1973 and 1988 (Figure 2 and 3). 
 
This reversal is clearly related to the nuclear programme reaching some kind 
of steady state: electricity exhausts all its niches in the absence of technologi-
cal break-through in biofuels or hydrogen. The REF scenario allows for a 
strong additionnal penetration of electricity on the industrial markets (Table 
4): by the year 2030 electricity meets 60% of industrial energy needs (feed-
stocks excluded), compared with 53% in 2005 and 47% today. Despite this 
penetration, the French energy strategy hits a hard core of fossil fuels con-
sumption in motor fuels and chemical uses, both among of the most dynamic 
increasing end-uses. In addition, the penetration of natural gas is squeezed 
between the non substitutable uses of oil and the increase of electricity use. 
 
In fact, the overall result is quite noteworthy: France would be able, simply by 
continuing its current energy trend, to reduce its CO2/GDP ration signifi-
cantly, an achievement which, if generalised to all industrialized countries, 
would stabilize the world emissions of CO2 by the middle of the next century. 
This perspective is nevertheless unsatisfactory; first, an efficient preventive 
strategy requires more ambitious abatement levels; second, during a negotia-
tion process, France cannot expect special treatment by putting forward its 
present achievements and asking for other countries to act first. 
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II.3. Controlling CO2 emissions: a wide range of 
possible policies 
II.3.1. The limits of the French model on the supply 
• Because of the conservative technical change hypotheses of the REF 
and ME scenarios the carbon tax merely succeeds in limiting the use of 
coal to coke in the steel industries, in slightly increasing the use of gas 
and in fostering combined cycle plant to meet peak demand for electri-
city. 
• More important evolutions could be envisaged such as industrial co-
generation and district heating; but they are not be triggered in these 
scenarios by a carbon tax only. Some reform in the price and financing 
policies of the French electric utility is a prerequisite to facilitate self-
generation. The MS and MS1 scenarios simulate this evolution as a re-
sult of the progressive harmonisation of rules in Western Europe and 
the pressure of some industries in favour of cogeneration. 
• Despite the rather low support to date in France for new and renewable 
energies, the APE agreed upon taking into account their possible devel-
opment beyond the current 6,5 Mtoe of wood fuel xxi. Maximum techni-
cal potentials for the penetration of these energy sources were then 
adopted in the MS and MS1 scenarios (see Tables 12 and 13).xxii. 
The results are unsurprising and confirm the narrowness of the remaining 
penetration margins for carbon free energies; hydroelectricity remains stable, 
the new renewable energies bring only additional 9.4 Mtoe and the continuing 
penetration of electricity into its market niches is only sufficient to stabilize 
the weight of nuclear power in the primary balance and to offset the increasing 
role of the end-uses linked to oil and gas (gasoline, feedstocks). 
Residential and commercial sectors. The main result is that, without drastic 
assumptions on energy efficiency and without allowing for possible evolutions 
in lifestyles and consumption patterns, the ME and MS scenarios succeed in 
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stabilizing the energy of these sectors and in decreasing the emissions by 43% 
from the REF scenario. 
The energy-efficiency policy succeeds in lowering average consumption by 
30% of the 2005 levels in old buildings with conventional heating, by 10% in 
old building with electric heating, and by 33% for new buildings with conven-
tional heating, and by from 15% for new buildings with electric heating. 
Moreover, significant progress is expected, and has been assumed, in lighting 
xxiii and most electrical appliances. 
Our scenarios show a rather good reaction to the carbon tax in these sectors 
since, between REF and REF1, energy consumption decreases by 23 Mtoe 
(Tables 4 and 6). This flexibility may be unexpected since many studies have 
demonstrated the low reaction to prices over the short and medium term,xxiv the 
APE projections to 2005 follow this conclusion since between the two scenar-
ios are distinguished only by the energy price hypotheses (US$22/bbl and 
US$35/bbl in 2005), residential and commercial energy consumption decreases 
only by 12% compared to 20% in the transportation sector and 33% in industry 
(steel excluded). This seemingly contradictory result can easily be explained 
by the slow rate of capital turnover in this sector. In the long term, this rigidity 
disappears and about 80% (17 Mtoe) of the reduction is due to the pure price 
induced acceleration of existing techniques. 
 
The stabilization of the final energy demand around 78 Mtoe (equal to that of 
1988), combined with the on-going penetration of electric heating, the moder-
ate substitution of gas for oil, and a moderate increase of solar energy brings 
about an abatement of 43% of the direct emissions from this sector in MS1 
compared to the REF scenario. This figure does not include the indirect emis-
sions in the electricity sector due to the use of fossil fuel to produce peak load 
electricity. The steepness of the low duration curve is clearly linked with the 
development of electric heating in winter. The question whether this could be 
reversed is controversial, but is not likely to change the orders of magnitude of 
our results. 
 
Industry. Using the accounting framework  
E/VA = Σi (VAi/VA) = Σiαi (Ei/Oi x Oi/VA)  
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the evolution of energy intensity in industry has been analysed as resulting 
from structural mutations (αi), from technical progress (Ei/Oi) and from a ten-
dency, slight but without apparent saturation effect, towards increasing value 
added per unit of material product (Oi/VA). From 2005 onwards the most sig-
nificant technical improvements are expected in the steel industry (increasing 
use of electric furnace limited only by tensions on the scrap iron markets), and 
in the chemical industry (through recycling of plastic products, use of natural 
gas and biomass-based fuels as feedstocks, and substitutes for oil). 
• The energy saved in the industrial sector between REF (the non-taxed 
business as usual scenario) and ME1 (the taxed energy -efficient sce-
nario) is equivalent to the quantity saved in the residential and commer-
cial sector (43 Mtoe, namely 29% of final consumption). However this 
reduction results from a quite different process. 
• First the savings between REF and REF1 are modest (5 Mtoe). The 
weak reaction to the carbon tax can be explained by a much better use 
of available technologies in the year 2005 (according to the APE re-
sults) than in the residential and commercial sector. This reflects a 
higher sensitivity to more efficient equipment, spurred by industrial 
competition and principally to a higher rate of capital turnover (between 
10 to 15 years in the industrial sector, more than 30 years on the resi-
dential and commercial sector, as far as buildings are concerned). 
The only degree of freedom left lies, then, in energy saving innovations. With 
the moderately optimistic technical hypotheses adopted in ME for 2030 we get 
a reduction of 22% from the REF scenario. This larger set of available tech-
nologies gives greater scope for the carbon tax to work:  between ME and 
ME1, it delivers a further 7% reduction in energy consumption. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the results of the residential and commercial sector, 
the mix of non-price incentives and carbon tax does not prevent a 65% in-
crease of final energy consumption and a 39% increase in the consumption of 
carbon based energy sources between 1988 and 2030 in scenario 2030 MEI. If 
we take into account the fact that, over the same period, the industrial value-
added grows at a 2.5% per year, these gains are by no means negligible. But 
they do not suffice in stabilizing CO2 emissions in the long term. 
More optimistic results come from the MS and MS1 scenarios where the rather 
industrialist perspective of the REF and ME scenarios is ruled out. An elastic-
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ity of 0.6 (in MS) instead of 0.8 (in REF and ME) between industry and GDP 
xxv brings an additional 24% reduction in final energy demand between ME1 
and MS1. Such a growth pattern enables to reach a 4% decrease in industrial 
sector CO2 emissions between 1988 and 2030. But it must be underlined that a 
sizeable part of this result is due to the partial relocation of some energy inten-
sive industries outside France. 
As a whole, the analysis shows that the existing trend towards lower energy 
intensities in the industrial sector is unable to offset the growth of output; ad-
ditional flexibility is conditional upon an innovation specifically directed to 
energy efficiency, and on structural change involving a possible shift from 
material based to information based economic growth. 
 
Transportation. In this sector, scenario ME1 achieves only a 7.2% decrease in 
energy consumption compared to the REF scenario, and a corresponding 9% 
decrease in CO2 emissions. The rigidity of this sector is easily explainable by 
three factors: 
 The impact of a carbon tax on consumer prices is far lower for fuels in 
transport than in other sectors because of the existing level taxation in France: 
an increase of 8.6% of the price of gasoline due to the carbon tax must be 
compared to 260% for coal, 34% for the industrial use of natural gas and even 
9% for electricity. 
• The gains in energy efficiency observed between 1973 and 1988, and 
the additional progress expected until 2005, have taken advantage of the 
technically easiest improvements. Beyond these easy improvements, 
factors such as the increase in the power of cars and the worsening of 
traffic conditions are expected to offset most of the additional gains in 
motor efficiency (see Figure 4). The rail for road or rail for air substitu-
tions are both slow and insensitive to pure price incentives, unless 
measures are taken to enhance consumer interest in railways. 
• The high rigidity of the transport sector is all the more unfor-
tunate since substitution between non-fossil fuels and oil 
based fuels is far more difficult here than in other sectors. 
Indeed, some technological breakthroughs may occur (elec-
tric cars for urban transport, hydrogen), but the economic ad-
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vantage of oil based fuels has been judged high enough to 
prevent a great diffusion of these solutions by the considered 
time horizon of 2030. 
• Consequently, only structural changes in transportation policy are likely 
to lower the emission profile of the sector. In the absence of tools for a 
convincing model of this type of policies, the following normative hy-
potheses were adopted for illustrative purposes in the MS and MS1 sce-
narios: 
• reduction of 20% in individual transport needs and of 30% for the air 
transport, because of the saturation of available flying routes, 
• Intermodal substitution of rail transport for freight, long-distance inter-
urban transportation and urban public transportation. 
• Moreover, a 15% increase in vehicle efficiency was assumed, arising 
from improvements in traffic conditions. 
This set of hypotheses is necessary to reach an abatement of CO2 emissions of 
the same order of magnitude than in the other sectors, 29% between REF and 
MS1. 
II.4. Some first lessons about price incentives, non-
price policies and structural issues 
• As was shown in Figure 2, the range of possible French CO2 emissions 
in 2030 is quite wide, between 92 Mt C pa in MS1 to 183 Mt C pa in 
REF; but not surprisingly so. It is more noteworthy that without struc-
tural change France fails in to meet the Toronto targets (20% abatement 
in 2005, 50% in 2030), even in the best case (MS2), with only a 17% 
abatement in 2030. Obviously, more satisfactory results could be ob-
tained via more optimistic hypotheses on carbon free technologies and 
on development patterns; but this analysis demonstrates that these tar-
gets will not be reached without important additional efforts or techno-
logical breakthrough. 
In terms of policy implications, the challenging conclusion is that shifting 
from the highest to the lowest scenario requires a combination of price signals, 
non-price incentives, and changes in long-term development patterns. 
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• The implementation of the carbon tax alone (from REF to REF1) leads 
to a 21% abatement of CO2 emissions, but that does not prevent a 7% 
increase in the absolute level of emissions between 2005 and 2030 (a 
40% increase from the 1988 level). The limitations of the tax policy 
come partly from the low flexibility of the industrial sector if a satura-
tion of energy saving technical progress is assumed in the long run; but 
they come mainly from the fact that, in the French context, the carbon 
tax has too slight an impact on current trends in the transport sector. 
• An energy-efficiency policy relying on incentives other than taxation 
(subsidies, information, standards, research and development pro-
grammes, etc) would be able to stabilize the emissions at the 1998 level, 
but only if they were implemented in combination with a carbon tax. 
This policy triggers technical progress towards energy efficiency and 
accelerates its diffusion, but, in the end, its effect is linked with the en-
ergy price level. However, efficient in promoting energy savings 
through technical progress in the industrial sector, the ME1 scenario 
(non price measures + carbon tax) fails to drastically lowering total 
emissions because of rigidities in the transport sector. 
• A more ambitious abatement of total emissions can only come from ad-
ditional structural changes, as described in the MS family scenarios. 
The critical point is that the choices between different structural paths 
are likely to be taken for reasons unconnected with energy and cli-
mate change issues, and that the mechanical impact of any carbon tax 
is likely to be small. 
The case of gasoline provides a good illustration. On the one hand the increase 
of the final price due to a FF1000 tC tax is too marginal to really hamper its 
progressive domination of the sector; on the other, the competitive advantage 
of the oil based car fuels is high enough to discourage the automobile and refi-
ning industries from taking the risk of a large-scale production of alternative 
motors and fuels. This does not rule out the possibility of technological break-
throughs; it simply means that these breakthroughs would be fostered by other 
factors than a concern for the greenhouse effect. The electrical car could be a 
solution to local pollution in the big cities, biofuels could be an attempt to se-
cure new markets for agricultural production and to rely less on imported 
energy and so on. 
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The above remarks, far from minimizing the interest of a carbon tax, help to 
highlight two key issues. First, taxation is only one part of the issue; in order 
to assess its effects, it is critical to specify in which context its implementation 
is being considered (accompanying measures, structural trends etc); second, 
we should not just focus on the mere allocative effects of the tax but also on 
its impact on collective expectations. 
In the case of France, one of the side effects expected from the carbon tax is to 
remind certain sectors of public administration that current energy prices do 
not reflect the long-term cost of energy supply, and ward off the permanent 
temptation to rescind energy-efficiency measures, for short term reasons. 
Similarly, in a context where the perspective of taxing bads instead of goods 
would be broadly accepted, it would be easier to take up measures to internal-
ize the costs of traffic congestion in current urban planning and transport poli-
cies. 
• These considerations have direct implications in terms of assessing the 
macroeconomic costs of greenhouse policies. A majority of the avail-
able studies start from an optimized baseline projection: they then com-
pute the shift induced by a taxation policy; and consequently cannot but 
conclude that they will be net macroeconomic costs. But measures in 
non-energy sectors unconnected with the greenhouse issue are likely to 
have strong consequences for the flexibility of our productive systems 
and therefore on the shape of the underlying production functions. 
• The high sensitivity of macroeconomic results to assumptions on the 
production function of the non-energy sectors is illustrated in Table 18 
with two sets of scenarios, REF and MS xxvi. The macroeconomic effect 
of the carbon tax is the product of a quasi-Keynesian effect of lower 
taxes on labour and production, and of the regressive effect of any re-
duction of the average productivity reflected in the price of the compos-
ite good (see the appendix for the role of parameter χ.in capturing tech-
nical progress). 
 
Macro-economic impacts of a compensated FF1000/t C carbon tax sensi-
tivity tests 
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REF Scenario  
 
χ 0 0,5% 1% 2,8% 
ΔGDP +1,65% +0,94% +0,24% -2,15% 
ΔN in million +574 000 +325 000 +83 000 -745 000 
 
MS Scenario  
 
χ 0 0,5% 1% 2,8% 
ΔGDP +0,88% +0,18% -0,4% -2,81% 
ΔN in million +305 000 +64 000 -172 000 -970 000 
 
• χ denotes the increase of the production cost of the composite good due 
to the carbon tax in the case of non-substitutability between energy and 
other production factors; the macroeconomic cost is between 2.5% and 
2.6% of the GDP, and it falls to between 1% an 1.5% if the substitution 
parameter between energy and the other input to production is assumed 
to be the same in the baseline and taxed scenario.xxvii. But a very slight 
change in this function is enough to create a situation where the benefits 
of decreasing other taxes offset the deadweight costs of the carbon tax. 
The cost of the composite good could remain constant in the case of a 
higher but reasonable optimism; in that latter case, the positive effect of 
the taxation scheme would lead to a slight increase of GDP. 
 
Those results are too preliminary to conclude that a response to the greenhouse 
issue could be achieved at no cost or at negative cost, but we would like to 
point out:  
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• to what extent the current results of current models can be reversed 
without drastic assumptions on the potential effect of a high tax on the 
long-term innovation process in the non-energy sectors; 
• to what extent it will be impossible to go beyond these precautionary 
remarks until we try to bridge the gap between the macroeconomic de-
scription of productionxxviii and a fuller description of the long-term 
prospectives for technology and development. 
III. SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES: COST 
ASSESSMENT, IRREVERSIBILITIES AND 
BIFURCATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
PATTERNS 
The flexibility that determines the global costs of climate policies depends a 
great deal on behaviour unconnected with energy policy or climatic change. 
This statement should be trivial but it was, at first, overlooked as long as the 
focus was on the impact of a carbon tax on the energy system, on final energy 
prices and on the macroeconomic impacts of the increase of these prices. 
Once an economy has achieved the substitution between fossil and non-fossil 
fuels in the electricity power sector, and improved the efficiency of the whole 
energy system (from primary energy to end use, the key role of some structural 
factors becomes obvious: the substitutability between materials (steel, non 
ferrous, chemical products, cement, biomass products), shifts between material 
based industries and information-based activities, and transport. 
This requires us to seek new approaches to link the energy sector to the rest of 
the economy. The task is to better capture the relationship between develop-
ment patterns and the behaviour of the macroeconomic box, keeping in mind 
the fact that the environmental disruptions are not caused by the amount of 
value-added itself but by the technical and material counterpart of this value-
added. Some examples from the transport sector help to illustrate the recurrent 
research directions. These directions are articulated around the concept of bi-
furcation, the reliance on several baseline scenarios for cost-assessment, and a 
broadening of the no-regrets concept. 
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III.1. Bifurcations; towards the use of several base-
line scenarios 
Two trends can be observed in France in the freight sector which would lead to 
a doubling of road freight on highways within 15 years: a shift towards road 
transport (by trucks) and an increase in the total volume of freight, under the 
influence of the  single European market. Reversing these would obviously 
require decisions on infrastructure, and also on pricing and taxation systems in 
order to account the full cost of road transport as opposed to rail or water. 
The key issue arises from the fact that, if these decisions are not taken before, 
say, the year 2000, we will certainly have gone beyond a bifurcation point and 
engaged in an irreversibility process, which can be analysed in two ways: 
• First, as an extension of the lock in process analysed in the literature;xxix 
learning curves, economies of scale, informational increasing returns, 
and above all positive network externalities, will act in favour of the 
system promoted by today's decisions, and market forces will close a 
self-reinforcing loop. Moreover, their localizational implications (at-
traction of services or activities around their proximity), induced in-
vestments (attraction of services or activities around their proximity), 
induced investments (doubling of a tunnel), the nature of skills and the 
degree of interests involved, will produce an inflexible system which 
will be hard to change over a reasonable timescale. 
• Second, each of the possible pictures of the freight system in the long 
term will unequally narrow the range of available choices and the flexi-
bility of the economy to both price or non-price incentives. They will 
entail drastically contrasted economic and political costs in the case of 
future actions to slow global warming. In the worst case action could 
become impossible. 
This bifurcation issue is not limited to choices between means of transport; it 
also encompasses innovation choices on motor fuels and, surely the most diffi-
cult, the evolution of demand for transport induced by alternative town plan-
ning patterns. More generally, it encompasses many network industries where 
market forces tend, beyond a bifurcation point, to reinforce the first choice 
instead of correcting it, in a self-fulfilling process.xxx 
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The first implication is that, at the date t, there are still several possible market 
equilibria at t+n, and several states of the world characterised by different 
technical contents, and not easily predictable from current trends. Trying to 
use some probability distribution is both difficult and misleading since the 
realization of one or other of the states of the world" in t+n depends on the 
very decisions made in t, and in fact on the collective expectations at that time 
t xxxi. The only sound answer is to work on the basis of several baseline scenar-
ios, not scenarios with high, medium or low versions, but characterized by 
alternative assumptions on development patterns and innovation.  
 
 
III.2. Implications for cost assessment analysis and 
new research directions 
 
A conventional cost-benefit approach may not be helpful in choosing the op-
timum scenario; it would require some reliable information on several (and 
mutually exclusive) baskets of goods, services and techniques, and a complete 
set of preferences, with partial ordering and transitivity, formulated by the 
agents, not on each good for a given context (the utility attached to driving a 
car to go to work) but on each good for alternative states of the world: to be 
obliged to cross Ile de France in the absence of new RER lines, or to benefit 
from high investments in metro infrastructures and from a reversal of tenden-
cies towards increasing distances between residential and business districts.  
 
Similarly, the technological cost curves used for ranking mitigation options 
depend heavily on the long-term marginal development cost of each technique, 
whose cost in turn depends on today ‘s decisions and on the context it will be 
used. It is possible to picture, within the next 40 years, an electric motor, a 2 
l/100 km gasoline motor, and a biofuel motor produced at the same, or even at 
lower, costs than current motors, thanks to economies of scales and learning 
curves. But, given the high research and development costs involved in a new 
motor xxxii, nothing ensures that equivalent research and development risks will 
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be incurred on these three technologies and that it will be possible to have at 
t+n three large-scale technologies competing on the same markets xxxiii. 
 
A cost assessment analysis can be consequently meaningful only at the margin 
of each scenario, where each is the result from observed trends, technological 
facts, future expectations, willingness to defend one's view on a given tech-
nology, arbitrary beliefs, political choices and value judgements. For each of 
these points, the longer the time horizon, the more controversial are the hy-
potheses. 
 
This context of decision under controversyxxxiv does not imply that the econo-
mist is not in position to inject some objectivity into the discussions. But, de-
parting from professional reflexes to maximize the predictive value of models, 
the economist must accept the fact that scientific controversies and disagree-
ments on value or political judgments mean that several possible stories are 
plausible. But, for an economist, it will be obvious that the viability of each 
scenario is conditional upon its economic consistency at two levels, macro-
economic equilibrium and microeconomic behaviour. The task is to try to sup-
ply the appropriate tools for bridging the gap between economics, engineering 
and political sciences. In order to achieve this bridge, two research lines are 
likely to be fruitful. 
 
First, a more systematic use of the properties of the general equilibrium con-
cept can be helpful for describing the final picture of each set of expectations, 
as illustrated modestly in the above attempt xxxv: a set of economic hypotheses 
can be associated with each set of technical hypotheses, ensuring the economic 
consistency of the resulting scenario. The obligation to make the values of 
these economic parameters clear is enough to rule out the most inconsistent 
combinations. Moreover it becomes possible to take into account the feedback 
effects to be expected from the implementation of each set of hypotheses. In 
other words, the economist accepts that many parameters are exogenous and 
controversial but, once the consistency between the set of non-economic as-
sumptions and the economic signals and flows is established, these relation-
ships become endogenous. The economist is then in a position to give the de-
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cision makers the logical implications of each set of assumptions, of each vi-
sion of the long term. 
 
Second, some additional work is required to model technical trajectories, their 
response to the economic and non-economic signals, and their sociopolitical 
viability. This call for additional work on behavioural submodels adapted to 
each sector and technique xxxvi lies beyond the simple solution adopted here i.e. 
in a specific institutional background. For example, countering the intuitive 
idea of higher capital requirements for rail systems, some experts xxxvii point 
out that total investment is of the order of FF0.3/t km for trucks and 0.12 for 
rail if we include investments in vehicles. xxxviii. But investments decisions are 
made by very different agents with different economic behaviour and it could 
be misleading to carry out any cost assessment of rail-road substitution with-
out any simplified description of this behaviour. 
 
III.3. About the no regrets concept 
 
The debate on no regrets strategies, linked today to the "efficiency gap" 
controversy, must be broadened to encompass bifurcation issues. In that case 
we are not in a situation in which consumers are supposed to adopt suboptimal 
behaviour because of market imperfections or incomplete information. Theore-
tically a road dominant system, or a rail/canal dominant system, can be assu-
med to be without any slacks, moving at its efficiency maximum, and consu-
mers can be assumed to be totally rational; but they are faced with either bas-
ket of goods and services, resulting from a long and cumulative process, and 
characterized by very different energy contents. 
 
Manne and Richels are right to underline the risks of technological forcing 
involved in a mere engineering vision of energy efficiency: beyond market 
imperfections (which undoubtedly exist in the case of energy markets), seem-
ingly irrational choices may take place, since consumers have a far more com-
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plex objective function than the minimisation of energy costs. Here we have 
another type of technological forcing. In network industries and infrastructure 
activities, public intervention is always necessary, prior to the realization of 
technical projects (whatever this intervention may imply - investment outlays 
on infrastructure , funding, standards, building licences, laws etc); this will in 
fact determine, directly or not, the range of options (often a single one) at the 
disposal of consumers. 
 
Since these public choices determine in the long run a good part of the energy 
path, embedded in transport and urban structures impossible to replace over-
night, it is legitimate to question their underlying collective preference func-
tion. In France's freight system for example, the long-term shift from rail to 
road arises from the flexibility of road transport - the door to door service - but 
also from the underpriced infrastructure for trucks, and the risks of strikes in 
the railway sector. But, having experienced, last July, the ease with which the 
truck drivers’ union was able to block traffic all over France, and faced with 
local protests against the extension of highways, the public authorities 
(broader than the national government) may be persuaded to introduce security 
and local environment as arguments of the collective preference curve and to 
review some components of the present incentive structure. 
 
From that perspective, climatic risks must be discussed as a new argument of 
this function. The no-regret concept goes further than the mere accounting of 
the negative costs of improved energy efficiency of a specific equipment; it 
encompasses the fact that the abatement of greenhouse gases becomes a by-
product of improvements on other dimensions of the collective preference 
function. 
 
The research on no regret strategies should therefore be focussed on the core 
of actions where this byproduction of positive externalities is possible. In this 
core, a specific attention must be given to measures enabling economies to 
avoid bifurcation (1) leading to fossil fuel intensive development patterns and 
technological paths, and (2) and also likely to have long-term unexpected 
negative impacts on the social welfare. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
As a conclusion, I would like to sketch here some ideas on the collaboration 
between energy and transport economists which has been proved to be neces-
sary to address the key issues of the long-term development-environment 
analysis. 
 
In the past two decades, energy economists have brought about a paradigmatic 
revolution: they focused on energy-growth decoupling and elaborated demand-
side approaches to complement the supply-side optimization, studying the ex-
ternal determinants of end-use demand. It seems that this type of questions has 
not yet reached the core of transport economics which focuses on the difficult 
problem of the choice between means of transport and the optimization net-
work infrastructures. 
 
With the opportunity provided by climate change issues, energy modelling 
could play a provocative role asking, for the sake of its own models, about the 
long-term determinants of transport needs, simply because the projection of 
their current exponential growth would drastically reduce the chance of the 
success of preventative policies. Freight transport does not raise the most dif-
ficult theoretical problem; it can be solved on the one hand by a better under-
standing of the geographic trends of economic activity, on the other, by a 
study of incentive structures which are better able to reflect the external costs 
of this sector (congestion, security, infrastructure maintenance). The issue of 
individual transport (for work or leisure) is quite different because we are con-
fronted by the risk of imposing undue normative constraints on the consumer. 
 
Similar to the transition in the energy field from measures aimed at minimiz-
ing the cost- of a given tonne of oil equivalent or kilowatt hour to the cost-
minimization of end-use energy as a whole, the first stake is to substitute the 
maximization of accessibility for the maximization of mobility as the key ar-
gument of the collective objective function in infrastructure policies: indeed, 
an increase in transport needs can either reflect an increase in welfare, or a 
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response to new, unexpected constraints, unfolding as a result of development 
patterns. The substitution between transportation and telecommunication is but 
a partial response, since the first trends observed in the 1980s indicate that the 
explosion of new telecommunication tools has increased geographical exten-
sion and the number of business contacts, which has induced higher rather 
than lower transport requirements. 
 
That is why we cannot avoid a thorough description of constraints likely to 
enable us to discover possible long-term saturation effects which the current 
trends does not reflect. Given uncertainty about these constraints, the time 
budget of the citizen could provide us with a solid accounting system which 
captures the ultimate constraints on the demand for individual transport. There 
is a long way before any reliable result will be in sight on that issue. However, 
linked with economic balances and the energy balances, this accounting could 
be the most efficient way to connect three types of expertise and to understand 
better some of the ultimate development issues raised by climate concerns. 
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